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Abstract 
 
 
Geographic Dispersion of Investors and Price Discovery around Earnings 
Announcements 
 
By 
 
Jason Victor Chen 
 
Chair: Reuven Lehavy 
 
 
Past research has documented a geographic role in the information available to 
investors. Specifically, studies have shown that value relevant information available to 
investors differs across locations and that it is less costly for local investors to obtain local 
information. Drawing on this body of research, I examine the influence of investor 
geographic dispersion on the price discovery process around earnings announcements. In 
particular, I explore whether the geographic dispersion of investors leads to a greater 
diversity of information amongst investors and, by extension, greater information 
asymmetry, greater trading volume, and ultimately more informative price following 
earnings announcements. Consistent with my predictions, I find that firms whose investors 
are more geographically dispersed experience higher abnormal bid-ask spreads, lower 
abnormal market depth, higher abnormal illiquidity, higher abnormal trading volume, and 
lower price drift or reversal around quarterly earnings announcements. I further find that 
these results are more pronounced for firms with a greater geographic distribution of 
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information. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of investor 
dispersion in the price discovery process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
When valuing firms, investors draw on a variety of sources in obtaining their 
information. For example, investors may use firm information regarding facilities, 
distribution hubs, or sales centers to gain insight into a company’s operations. Or, they may 
use information about competitors, consumer preferences, political policies, and numerous 
other aspects of the business landscape to form a more complete base of knowledge about 
a firm. However, a key challenge in acquiring this information is that it does not reside in 
a central repository, but instead is spread across numerous locations (Hayek 1945). This 
geographic distribution imposes a significant cost on investors who attempt to aggregate 
the information (Addoum et al. 2013). Much of this information may only be acquired 
locally through direct experience or is prohibitively costly for non-local investors to obtain 
due to limitations on their attention (Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Coval and Moskowitz 
2001). While prior research has documented a relation between an individual investor’s 
location and his or her trading behavior, the role of the dispersion in investor’s locations in 
the price discovery process remains an open question. In this study, I contribute to our 
understanding of the role of dispersion by providing novel empirical evidence that firms 
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with geographically dispersed investors have more diversely informed investors 
facilitating their price discovery around earnings announcements. 
Specifically, I posit that the impact of investor dispersion on information diversity 
affects three aspects of the price discovery process around earnings announcements: 
information asymmetry, trading volume, and the informativeness of price. To examine the 
impact of dispersion on these three elements of price discovery, I develop a series of 
predictions based upon prior research which suggests that investors utilize private 
information when evaluating public disclosures (Kim and Verrecchia 1994). First, I predict 
that firms with greater investor dispersion will exhibit greater information asymmetry 
between the market and market makers during the price discovery process around earnings 
announcements. Next, I predict that greater investor dispersion will lead to greater trading 
among investors, who draw on their individual knowledge base when interpreting earnings 
announcements. Third, I predict that greater dispersion will lead to more informative 
prices, as investors are able to incorporate their local information into the price discovery 
process. Finally, to validate my predictions, I hypothesize that the above effects will be 
stronger for firms with a greater distribution of information across locations. 
In my tests of these predictions, I use a unique dataset which contains the latitudinal 
and longitudinal locations of market participants who use the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (hereafter, EDGAR) filing system during each of the fiscal quarters 
between 2005Q1 and 2012Q1. This sample allows me to estimate the location of individual 
market participants who have actively sought information about a specific firm.  
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To measure information asymmetry, I use the following three proxies: abnormal 
bid-ask spreads, abnormal market depth, and abnormal illiquidity around quarterly 
earnings announcements. Applying these three measures of information asymmetry to the 
firms in my sample, I find that a greater geographic dispersion of investors is associated 
with higher abnormal bid-ask spreads, lower abnormal market depth, and higher abnormal 
illiquidity around quarterly earnings announcements. Higher abnormal bid-ask spreads 
suggest that market makers are less willing to transact at a low cost during price discovery 
(Lee and Ready 1991). Lower abnormal market depth and higher abnormal illiquidity 
suggest greater abnormal movements in price for each trade during the price discovery 
process (Goyenko et al. 2009). Together, these findings support the idea that firms with 
greater investor dispersion experience greater information asymmetry during price 
discovery around earnings announcements. 
In addition to information asymmetry, I examine the effect of geographic dispersion 
on the extent of trading during the price discovery process. Here, I find that investor 
dispersion is positively associated with abnormal trading volume in the immediate period 
around quarterly earnings announcements. This finding is consistent with my prediction 
that greater investor geographic dispersion leads to greater diversity in individual investor 
knowledge, which in turn contributes to greater differences in investor interpretations of 
earnings announcements. 
Next, I examine the impact of investor dispersion on the informativeness of price 
following earnings announcements, using the extent of price drift or reversal following 
quarterly earnings announcement (hereafter, DriftRev) as my proxy for the informativeness 
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of price. Prior research suggests that under (over) reactions to new information are 
corrected over time as realizations of the expectations based upon the new information 
make their way into price or as other information is slowly incorporated by the market 
(Bernard and Thomas 1989; Rangan and Sloan 1998). Based on this, I measure the 
informativeness of price using the difference between the market’s immediate and long 
term reaction to earnings news. Specifically, I measure DriftRev as the absolute value of 
the percentage difference between the abnormal return in the immediate period around the 
earnings announcement and the abnormal return over a long window period. Doing so, I 
find that firms with greater investor dispersion have lower DriftRev, supporting the 
prediction that greater dispersion is associated with a more informative price.  
Finally, I predict that my observed relations will be stronger for firms whose 
information is more geographically distributed. To estimate the geographic distribution of 
information about a firm, I tally the number of unique states and countries mentioned in 
the firm’s 10-K filing. I then partition my sample into firms with high and low distribution 
of information based on whether they are above or below the median of this tally. My 
findings show that the effect of investor dispersion on abnormal bid-ask spreads, abnormal 
depth, abnormal illiquidity, abnormal trading volume, and price drift or reversal, 
respectively, is more pronounced for firms with a high number of unique states and 
countries mentioned in their 10-K filings. Combined, this set of results provides further 
evidence for my hypotheses that investor dispersion leads to greater information diversity 
in the price discovery process.  
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My analysis of the effect of investor geographic dispersion on price discovery 
contributes to the literature related to the effect of investor location on trading behavior. 
Much of this research has focused on the effect of an individual investor’s geographic 
location on his or her information acquisition and trading profits (Feng and Seasholes 2004; 
Grinblatt and Keloharju 2011; Coval and Moskowitz 2001). The findings in my study 
extend our understanding of the role of investor location by providing evidence that the 
dispersion of firm’s investors plays a role in price discovery process around earnings 
announcements.1 My study most closely relates to a concurrent working paper which 
examines the relation between the aggregate average distance of investors to the firm’s 
headquarters and the markets response to earnings announcements (Chi and Shanthikumar 
2014). 
This study also contributes to the literature which explores the use of the EDGAR 
filing system. One criticism of prior studies which have explored this setting is that little is 
known about the characteristics of the individuals accessing the EDGAR filing system. By 
focusing on investor location, my study contributes to our understanding of EDGAR users, 
thereby enriching our understanding of the results from other studies based on the EDGAR 
filing system (Drake et al. 2012a, 2012b; Lee et al. 2013). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 further develops my 
hypothesis and formally outlines my predictions. Chapter 3 provides details regarding my 
estimation of the geographic dispersion of firm investors. Chapter 4 details the market and 
control variables used in my study and discusses sample descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 
                                                          
1 The findings in this study also contribute to research which explores the conditions under which price is more likely to 
be informative (Lee 2001; Kothari 2001; Beyer et al. 2010).  
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discusses my research design and findings. Chapter 6 presents robustness, and Chapter 7 
concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Prior Research and Predictions 
2.1 Prior Research on the Effects of Geographic Location on Information Acquisition 
Prior research has shown that an investor’s distance to information affects whether 
that investor acquires and trades upon it. It suggests that investor attention and resource 
constraints make it more difficult for non-local investors to acquire local information. 
Consequently, local investors earn greater returns than non-local investors since they are 
better able to acquire value relevant information about a given firm. Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005) examine individuals’ trades placed through a discount brokerage and 
find that the average household earns greater returns from their holdings in local companies 
when compared to their non-local holdings. Massa and Simonov (2006) find similar 
evidence for a sample of individual level trades by Swedish investors.    
Studies find that the advantage of a local presence extends to managers and 
sophisticated investors suggesting that this effect is not isolated to a specific class of 
investor. For instance, Giroud (2013) provides evidence that when managers are in closer 
proximity to a plant, their information asymmetry decreases and they are thus better able 
to monitor a plant’s operations. In another study, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that 
the local investments of fund managers outperform their non-local picks. They argue that 
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these findings are a result of fund managers having a local information advantage to non-
local investors. 
My study primarily draws from the prior literature on the relation between investor 
location and information diversity. Generally speaking, extant research argues that the 
costs imposed on acquiring information by investor’s distance to information lead to 
geographically segmented pools of knowledge. Corroborating this, research finds that 
individual investors who are located near one another exhibit similar trading behavior. For 
example, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find evidence of correlated trading among investors 
who place trades from the same branch office of a local brokerage. In another study, Hong, 
Kubik, and Stein (2005) show that this effect extends to sophisticated investors, finding 
that individual mutual fund managers who are located in the same city exhibit similar 
buying and selling behavior.  
2.2. Predictions 
I build upon these findings in the extant literature and argue that when an investor 
base is more geographically dispersed, they are more likely to be located in a greater 
number of distinct local pools of knowledge. Ultimately, this leads to greater diversity of 
value relevant information among a firm’s investors. Theory suggests that this effect of the 
geographic dispersion of investors on the diversity of information among investors has 
potential important implications on how earnings announcements are incorporated by the 
market during the price discovery process.  
In classical theories of price discovery, information is incorporated into firm 
valuations easily and uniformly across investors (Grossman 1976). These theories assume 
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that investors inherently know how new information is incorporated into price. Extending 
this assumption, one would expect that public disclosures of new information would be 
followed by immediate price adjustment and potentially no abnormal market activity, as 
this information would be instantly reflected in price (Milgrom and Stokey 1982). 
However, empirical studies contradict this prediction, and instead find evidence of 
abnormal market activity around public releases of information (Bamber 1987; Ball and 
Brown 1968; Carter and Soo 1999). A more recent stream of research proposes that 
investor’s interpretation of new disclosures depends upon the information they already 
possess (Harris and Raviv 1993; Kim and Verrecchia 1994). Therefore, a public disclosure, 
such as an earnings announcement, isn’t necessarily value relevant in and of itself but rather 
the market’s reaction to the disclosure will depend upon the private information of each 
investor.  
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
If geographically dispersed investors draw from diverse local information sources 
then there is greater potential for more diversity in the private information that investors 
possess during the price discovery process around earnings announcements. This diversity 
of information suggests that the market as a whole is potentially more informed. If so, then 
this places market makers at a greater information disadvantage to the market when 
investors are geographically dispersed thus leading market makers to price protect 
themselves (Kyle 1985, Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Madureira and Underwood 2008). 
This leads to my first prediction:  
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Prediction 1: There is a positive association between the geographic dispersion of 
investors and information asymmetry during the price discovery process around a firm’s 
earnings announcement. 
2.2.2 Trading 
Following the above argument, if geographically dispersed investors possess 
diverse private information, they may draw different conclusions regarding how new 
information pertains to price, which in turn would lead to trading among investors (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1994, Verrecchia 2001). Indeed, Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide 
empirical evidence supporting this idea, finding that the trading volume which takes place 
around the release of earnings can be partially explained by different interpretations of the 
announcement due to differences in investor private information. Therefore, firms with 
greater investor geographic dispersion may exhibit greater trading volume during the price 
discovery process.2 This leads to my second prediction:  
Prediction 2: There is a positive association between the geographic dispersion of 
investors and trading during the price discovery process around a firm’s earnings 
announcement. 
2.2.3 Informativeness of Price 
Price is informative following price discovery in that it aggregates the information 
possessed by investors which is revealed through their trades. Therefore, if geographically 
                                                          
 
2 Informed investors face a subtle tradeoff between executing a trade when liquidity is potentially lower and being 
informed. My argument assumes that informed investors, on average, rush to trade upon their private information.  
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dispersed investors draw from a greater diversity of unique local information sources, then 
they are potentially incorporating a greater amount of information into price during the 
price discovery process which takes places around earnings announcements (Beaver 1997; 
Hong and Page 2001; Watson et al. 1993). This leads to my third prediction: 
Prediction 3: There is a positive association between the geographic dispersion of 
investors and the informativeness of price following the price discovery process around a 
firm’s earnings announcement.  
2.2.4 Geographic Distribution of Information 
My final set of predictions extends the previous predictions. Predictions (1) through 
(3) are based on the idea that geographically dispersed investors acquire and incorporate 
unique local knowledge into price discovery. Cross-sectionally, this idea implies that firms 
with a greater geographic distribution of information should provide geographically 
dispersed investors with more opportunities to acquire and incorporate unique local 
knowledge. Therefore, I predict that the respective associations between the geographic 
dispersion of investors and a firm’s price discovery (information asymmetry, trading, and 
informativeness of price) should be more pronounced for firms with a greater geographic 
distribution of information. This leads to my final set of predictions:  
Prediction 4a: The positive association between the geographic dispersion of investors 
and information asymmetry during the price discovery process around a firm’s earnings 
announcement is greater for firms with a greater geographic distribution of information. 
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Prediction 4b: The positive association between the geographic dispersion of investors 
and trading during the price discovery process around a firm’s earnings announcement is 
greater for firms with a greater geographic distribution of information. 
Prediction 4c: The positive association between the geographic dispersion of investors 
and the informativeness of price following the price discovery process around a firm’s 
earnings announcement is greater for firms with a greater geographic distribution of 
information. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Estimating Investors Locations and Measuring their Geographic Dispersion 
3.1 Estimating Investors Locations 
To estimate where firms’ investors are geographically located, I use the locations 
of the requests for companies’ filings to the EDGAR online filing system.3 This system, 
created by the SEC in 1995, provides an electronic method for public companies to submit 
their filings. EDGAR also provides a comprehensive repository of all public companies’ 
filings, which is freely accessible to the public via the Internet.  
The web server log files of the EDGAR filing system where provided by the SEC 
through a freedom of information act request. The log files span from 2/4/2003 to 
3/30/2012, providing approximately 9 years of requests to the EDGAR system. The log 
files provide the Internet address, filing accessed, and date of access for each request among 
other information.4 5 
                                                          
 
3 This measure of investors encapsulates individuals who have shown an active interest searching for information about 
the firm.  
 
4 The log files do not include requests made to the EDGAR FTP server.  
 
5 Internet address refers to the unique Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPV4) address of the request. 
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I implement heuristics to remove requests likely to have been generated from 
automated programs. First, I check if there have been more than 100 filings downloaded 
by a unique Internet address in a given day. I then check if at least 90 percent of those are 
text documents; if so, I conclude that the requests have been automatically generated and 
remove the requests from the associated Internet address from my sample for the day. The 
rationale behind this process is that the text documents contain meta-data and the raw code 
for attachments which are, for the most part, only machine readable. I next check if there 
have been more than 10 downloads of any type of filing in any given minute from a specific 
Internet address. If so, I remove all requests from that Internet address for the day.67 Much 
like the first heuristic, the purpose of this check is to determine if an automated script is 
accessing the EDGAR website. These heuristics reduce the initial sample of 3,822,564,344 
requests to 508,619,475, a reduction of approximately 87%. The magnitude of this 
reduction is consistent with that of prior studies using the EDGAR server logs after they 
have been subjected to a similar set of heuristics (Lee et al. 2013). 
For the remaining sample of requests, I use Internet address to location lookup 
tables to find the latitudinal and longitudinal locations of the Internet addresses associated 
with each of the requests. Specifically, these tables map blocks of the Internet address space 
to specific latitude and longitude locations. The Internet address to location tables are 
indicated as being approximately 99% accurate at the country level. At the US level, most 
                                                          
 
6 If users are behind a static network address translation (NAT) box then this heuristic may overly remove Internet 
addresses which are associated with multiple distinct individuals. Static NAT has 1 IP address and hence all users behind 
a static NAT box will appear in the EDGAR server logs as having the same IP address. Static NAT is typically used for 
small networks while dynamic NAT is used for more complex networks. I don’t believe that this will systematically 
affect my sample selection. 
 
7 The limit of 10 was chosen based upon my estimates of the speed of automated requests which appear in the server logs 
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of the locations are accurate to approximately the center of the postal ZIP code of the 
request.8 To verify the accuracy of the locations, I cross-check a sample of locations with 
those obtained using other Internet address location services. I use monthly historic 
mappings of Internet addresses to locations as there is approximately a 1% to 5% monthly 
turnover in the Internet address space each month. The location lookup tables provide 
location information from 1/1/2005 to 12/31/2012. 
3.1.1 Investor Location Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 provides a summary of the requests to the EDGAR filing system used in 
my study. Removing automated downloads as well as requests without location 
information or a CIK-to-GVKEY match yields a final sample size of 258,001,440 requests 
between 1/1/2005 and 3/30/2012. Interestingly, there is a clear growth trend in the number 
requests, from 33,609,976 distinct requests in 2005 to 111,475,245 in 2011.  
 I examine the locations of the requests to better understand where the variation in 
investor’s locations comes from and to ensure that my sample is consistent with prior 
research and anecdotal evidence about the locations of investors in the US capital market. 
Table 2 shows that approximately 77% of all requests originate from within the United 
States. This finding is not surprising since the EDGAR filings system is primarily for US 
based companies. It is also consistent with estimates of the percentage of the US-based 
capital flows in the US capital market (OFII 2013). 
                                                          
 
8 Further analysis suggests that certain areas of the US appear to have location information more accurate than ZIP code 
level. However, this was not officially confirmed by the provider. 
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The findings in Table 2 also show that the largest proportion of US-based requests 
comes from the New York City area. This geographic area comprises approximately 9.75% 
of all requests in my sample. This is consistent with my priors as well as anecdotal evidence 
supporting New York City as the financial capital of the US. The other cities which 
comprise the Top 10 cities for total number of requests in my sample include Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Houston, San Francisco, Washington, Dallas, Boston, Toronto, and Philadelphia. 
In general, these cities are also known for having active financial centers.   
I conduct a borough-level analysis of the requests originating from the New York 
City area to provide further validation for the idea that requests tend to come from areas 
with greater financial activity. In particular, I expect most of these requests to come from 
Manhattan. According to the 2011 employment analysis of the city, approximately 12% of 
all those employed within Manhattan are associated with the financial services industry. 
This is in comparison to only 2.8% within the other four boroughs (NYCEDC 2013). If 
market participants are the primary drivers of the requests to the EDGAR filing system, 
then I would expect most New York City based requests to originate from within the 
Manhattan area. Figure 3 illustrates the locations of the requests for firms’ filings within 
New York City. As illustrated, the majority of the requests indeed originate from the 
Manhattan area.  
3.2 Measuring Investor Geographic Dispersion 
After determining the locations of a firms’ investors, I estimate the geographic 
dispersion of a firm’s investor base using a measure of dispersion based upon the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (hereafter, Herfindahl Index). The Herfindahl Index is 
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calculated as the sum of squares of the characteristic of interest divided by the square of 
the sum of that characteristic (Berger and Ofek 1995). The Herfindahl Index was originally 
created to measure industry competition (Li et al. 2013; Giroud and Mueller 2011). 
However, it can also be used to measure the concentration of various characteristics. For 
example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) adopt the Herfindahl Index to measure the 
concentration of firm ownership while Ahuja (2000) uses it to measure international patent 
concentration. 
To calculate my Investor Geographic Dispersion Index, I divide the globe into 
segments of approximately 5 degree shifts in latitude and longitude, or square geographic 
segments of approximately 700km in diagonal length based on the Haversine formula.910 I 
choose this distance because it is approximately equal to the size of the average US state. 
This process yields approximately 18,792 possible unique geographic segments, excluding 
areas covered by water.11 Applying this to the requests in my sample, I find that there are 
5,528 unique geographic segments from which filing requests originate. My Investor 
Geographic Dispersion Index is calculated as follows.  
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 = −1 ∗ [
∑ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑟,𝑖,𝑡
2𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆
𝑟
(∑ 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑟,𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆
𝑟 )
2] (1) 
                                                          
 
9 700km diagonal length is approximately equal to the size of Oregon. 
 
10 The Haversine formula tends to over/under estimate distances between two latitude points depending on their distance 
from the equator. Since the majority of the requests in my sample originate from within +45 degrees latitude of the 
equator differences in distances due to this are negligible. 
 
11 There are approximately 64,800 total possible unique geographic segments. 
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where InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of investors measured over the quarter 
prior to a firm’s earnings announcements, GEOREGIONS is each of the unique 5x5 degree 
segments of the globe and uniquerequests is the total number of unique requests that 
originate from the given geographic segment over the prior quarter. I multiply the ratio by 
-1 so that larger values of InvestorGeoDisp can be interpreted intuitively as reflecting 
greater investor geographic dispersion. i and t are firm and year-quarter, respectively. 
 Figure 4 illustrates differences in the dispersion of the locations of the requests for 
firms’ filings between firms with high and low investor geographic dispersion. The figure 
is constructed by first sorting firms in my sample in 2011 by InvestorGeoDisp.12 The 
locations of the request are then plotted for firms in the top 10% and in the bottom 10% of 
InvestorGeoDisp, respectively Figure 4a and Figure 4b. The figures show that the locations 
of the requests originate from a greater number of unique locations for the high investors 
geographic dispersion sample than the low sample.  
  
                                                          
 
12 I restricted this to 2011 due to limitations on the mapping software. 2011 was chosen because it is the last full year of 
data in my sample. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Market Variables, Control Variables, and Sample Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Market Variables 
In this section, I define the market variables used in my study. I calculate abnormal 
measures of bid-ask spread, depth, illiquidity, and trading volume as the difference between 
the measures during the event window and a non-event window. I use abnormal measures 
for each of the variables to remove any potential firm specific cross-sectional variation. I 
follow prior research and use the trading days T-1 to T+1, where T is the day of the 
quarterly earnings announcement as the event period, (Bamber 1987; Asthana and Balsam 
2001). The non-event window is defined as trading days T-54 to T-5. For my tests of 
abnormal drift or reversals in price, I measure abnormal price drift or reversal in relation 
to a value-weighted measure of market performance. 
4.1.1 Abnormal Bid-Ask Spread 
Prior studies suggest that the bid-ask spread is a reflection of adverse selection risk 
(Lee et al. 1993; Lee and Ready 1991). That is, specialists may protect themselves from 
trading at an information disadvantage through price, which is reflected in the size of the 
bid-ask spread. In particular, larger bid-ask spreads imply that market participants perceive 
greater information asymmetry and hence are less willing to transact at a low cost.  
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To calculate abnormal bid-ask spreads around quarterly earnings announcements 
for the firms in my sample, I use the bid and offer prices from the Trade and Quotes (TAQ) 
database. For each day in the event period, I calculate the average difference between the 
offer and bid prices for a firm’s stock quotes, scaled by the average of the offer and bid 
price for the quote. I scale the spread because prior studies suggest that the size of the 
spread can be mechanically related to the magnitude of a firm’s stock price (Garfinklel 
2009). I then calculate abnormal bid-ask spread as the difference between the average bid-
ask spread during the event period and the average over the non-event period, scaling by 
the standard deviation of the non-event bid-ask spread to normalize its distribution. 
4.1.2 Abnormal Market Depth 
Specialists may also attempt to protect themselves from risk by offering a lower 
quantity of shares at a given price (Lee et al. 1993), thereby impacting market depth. Since 
market depth is related to the order size needed to move market price, a deeper market 
suggests a lower perceived risk of transacting at an information disadvantage.  
I use trading information obtained from the TAQ database to calculate abnormal 
market depth.  I multiply the average bid size by the bid price plus the offer size multiplied 
by the offer price for all quotes of a firm’s stock during a particular day. I calculate 
abnormal depth around earnings announcements by subtracting the average trading depth 
during the event period from the average trading depth during the non-event period, scaling 
by the standard deviation of the daily trading depth during the non-event period to 
normalize the distribution. 
4.1.3 Abnormal Illiquidity 
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Illiquidity is used in prior studies to capture the relation between order flow and 
price movement (Amihud 2002). Kyle (1985) suggests that market makers use order flow 
to control for risk. Thus, greater illiquidity can be interpreted as an indication of greater 
perceived risk or greater information asymmetry.  
I use the method described in Amihud (2002) to calculate illiquidity around 
quarterly earnings announcements. I first calculate the absolute price change per dollar of 
daily trading volume. The ratio is averaged over the event period around a firms’ quarterly 
earnings announcement. I then estimate the average change per dollar in daily trading 
volume during the non-event windows and subtract this average from the average over the 
event window, scaling by the standard deviation of the ratio over the non-event window to 
normalize the distribution. 
4.1.4 Abnormal Trading Volume 
In addition to differences in perceptions of risk, investors may differ in their 
valuations of a firm thereby leading to increased trading. To measure abnormal trading 
volume, I follow a similar approach to that outlined in Asthana and Balsam (2001). 
Specifically, I calculate abnormal volume, AVolume, as the average daily trading volume 
over the event period minus the average daily trading volume for the firm over the non-
event period, using daily trading volume information obtained from CRSP, scaling by the 
standard deviation of the volume over the non-event period. I truncate AVolume at the 99% 
level to mitigate the impact of a small subset of extreme outliers. 
4.1.5 Abnormal Price Drift or Reversal 
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I estimate the informativeness of price around quarterly earnings announcements 
by calculating the difference between the event window price reaction and the future long 
window abnormal returns. To assess the initial price movement, I make an assumption 
about the correct price reaction to the earnings announcement. Prior studies suggest that 
under (over) reactions to news are corrected over time as realizations of the expectations 
based upon the news event are impounded into price or as the information itself is slowly 
incorporated by the market. However, since the timeframe for this correction process is 
open to question, I use the market price after several windows following the earnings 
announcement to proxy for what the correct price reaction should have been during the 
event window. Specifically, I use the firm market price at 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 days after 
the announcement as my respective proxies for the correct price.  
After identifying a correct price, I calculate the percentage difference between the 
reaction during the event window and the reaction over each of five long window returns. 
Specifically, I subtract the abnormal returns in the three day window around the earnings 
announcement from the abnormal returns starting one day before the earnings 
announcement and ending on each of the five long window return days. I then divide this 
number by the abnormal returns over the long window and take the absolute value of the 
result. I use value-weighted abnormal returns to account for changes in a firm’s stock price 
caused by market-wide movements. Finally, I take the log of the percentage to reduce the 
size of the distribution: 
 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (|
(𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡+𝑇 − 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡+1)
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡+𝑇
|) 
(2) 
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where DriftRev is the abnormal drift or reversal in price following an earnings 
announcement. AbnormalReturn is calculated as the compounded returns of a firm’s stock 
minus the value-weighted compounded returns of the market over the same window. T is 
the long window time period and is equal to 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 trading days following the 
earnings announcement. i and t are firm and year-quarter, respectively.  
4.2 Control Variables 
The controls that I include in my analysis capture firm and information environment 
characteristics that prior studies have found to be associated with the price discovery 
process. Below is a brief discussion of the motivation for each control; detailed definitions 
of each variable can be found in Appendix A. 
The first characteristic that I control for is investor attention surrounding an 
earnings announcement. To measure investor attention, I use three distinct proxies 
(Dellavigna & Pollet 2008; Hirshleifer et al. 2009; Drake et al. 2012c): 1) a dummy for 
whether the earnings announcement was released on a Friday (Friday), 2) the total number 
of earnings announcements released on the same day (NumEA), and 3) the total number of 
requests for a firm’s filings around the earnings announcement (Log_TotalRequests(-1,1)). 
I include the number of requests for the firm’s filings during the quarter 
(Log_TotalRequests_Pre) to proxy for overall investor attention on the firm.  
In addition to investor attention, I include several firm-specific controls in my 
analysis. First, I include the log of both the market value of the firm’s equity 
(Log_MarketValue) and the firm’s book-to-market ratio (Log_BooktoMarket) to proxy for 
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firm size and growth, respectively (Fama and French 1992). To proxy for firm 
performance, I use the absolute value of the abnormal returns of the firm in the pre-earnings 
announcement period (Abs_Abn_Return_Pre) (Solomon and Soltes 2011). I also include 
the absolute value of ROA (Abs_ROA) and the absolute value of the earnings surprise 
(Abs_Median_Miss) to control for any performance-related information disclosed during 
the announcement.  
I include the percentage of institutional holdings (Pcnt_InstitHoldings) and the log 
of the number of earnings forecasts (Log_NumAnalysts) to control for the effect of 
shareholder sophistication and information intermediaries on the price discovery process 
(Drake et al. 2012). I include a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the total number of 
unique states and countries mentioned in the firm’s 10-K filing is above the median 
(FirmGeoDist) to proxy for the geographic distribution of information about the firms.   
4.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
I combine the investor geographic dispersion data with quarterly accounting 
information from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly, information about analysts and their 
estimates from Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), market information from 
CRSP and Trade and Quote (TAQ), and information about the distribution of the firm’s 
business from firms’ annual 10-K filings. The sample, after requiring the necessary data, 
comprises approximately 74,200 firm quarter observations between 1/1/2005 and 
3/31/2012 and includes 5,695 unique firms. Descriptive statistics for the sample are 
provided in Table 3. The table shows that the mean (median) firm in my sample has a 
market value of $694.36 million ($659.84 million), book-to-market value of 0.63 (0.71), 
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percentage of institutional investment of 55.4% (62.2%), and analyst following of 4.1 
(4.00).13  
Table 4 presents the Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the 
diagonal) correlations between the main variables in my study. The correlations show that 
investor geographic dispersion (InvestorGeoDisp) is highly and positively correlated with 
the amount of attention on the firm (Log_TotalRequets_Pre) and with the amount of 
attention around the earnings announcement (Log_TotalRequets(-1,1)). It is also positively 
correlated with abnormal bid-ask spread around the earnings announcement (ABid-Ask(-
1,1)), the absolute value of ROA (abs_ROA), the absolute value of performance during the 
quarter (Abs_Abn_Return_Pre), the percentage of institutional investment in the firm 
(Pcnt_InstitHoldings), and analyst following (Log_NumAnalysts). It is negatively 
correlated with abnormal illiquidity (AIlliquidity(-1,1)), price drift or reversal (DriftRev5), 
whether the announcement occurred on a Friday (Friday), the number of concurrent 
earnings announcements released (NumEA), the absolute value of the earnings miss 
(Abs_Median_Miss), and the size of the firm (Log_MarketValue).  
  
                                                          
 
13 The mean (median) analyst following in my sample is large since I require at least one analyst forecast to control for 
the markets expectation of earnings.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Research Design and Findings 
5.1 Information Asymmetry around Earnings Announcements 
I use the following OLS regression model to examine whether investor geographic 
dispersion is associated with greater information asymmetry around a firms quarterly 
earnings announcement: 
 
𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖Σ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡
+ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖  
  
(3) 
where IA represents the three measures of information asymmetry: abnormal bid-ask 
spreads, abnormal trading depth, and abnormal liquidity around quarterly earnings 
announcements. Each abnormal measure is calculated as its average during the event period 
minus its average during the non-event period divided by its standard deviation during the 
non-event period. Controls include firm size, firm growth, institutional investment, 
absolute performance during the quarter, analyst following, overall investor attention, the 
geographic distribution of the firm, investor attention toward earnings announcements, the 
absolute value of the earnings miss, and the absolute value of ROA. i and t are firm and 
year-quarter, respectively. I include industry-fixed effects to control for industry-specific 
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idiosyncratic differences in geographic dispersion. I include fixed effects for year and 
month to control for idiosyncratic time effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
report date. 
The results of model (3) for abnormal bid-ask spreads are shown in Table 5 
Columns 2 and 3. As predicted, the coefficient estimate on InvestorGeoDisp is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient of 1.4318 suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in InvestorGeoDisp of 0.036 leads to a change in 
abnormal ABid-Ask(-1,1) of 0.0515. The magnitude of this effect is 3.82% of the standard 
deviation of ABid-Ask(-1,1) (1.349) and 0.10 times the magnitude of the mean (0.499). 
 The findings in Table 5 Columns 4 through 7 suggest that the price impact of the 
average trade is higher when there is greater investor geographic dispersion and support 
the prediction that investor dispersion is associated with greater information asymmetry 
within the market during price discovery. Specifically, Table 5 Column 5 shows the results 
for the regression of abnormal depth around quarterly earnings announcements on investor 
geographic dispersion and controls. The coefficient estimate on InvestorGeoDisp is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient of -0.3270 
on InvestorGeoDisp suggests that a one standard deviation increase in InvestorGeoDisp 
leads to a -0.0118 difference in ADepth(-1,1). This is approximately 1.16% of the standard 
deviation of ADepth(-1,1) (1.011) and 5.89 times the magnitude of the mean (-0.002). Next, 
Table 5 Column 7 presents results for the regression of abnormal illiquidity around 
quarterly earnings announcements (AIlliquidity(-1,1)) on investor geographic dispersion 
(InvestorGeoDisp) and controls. The coefficient estimate on InvestorGeoDisp is 0.2374 
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and is statistically significant at the 5% level. A one standard deviation increase in 
InvestorGeoDisp leads to a 0.0085 increase in AIlliquidity(-1,1) which is approximately 
1.20% of the standard deviation in AIlliquidy(-1,1) (0.713) and 1.42 times the magnitude 
of the mean of AIlliquidity(-1,1)(-0.003).  
 In general, the coefficient estimates on the control variables for investor attention 
on earnings announcements (Log_TotalRequests, Friday, and NumEA) suggest that greater 
attention is associated with lower information asymmetry. This is consistent with greater 
attention contributing to a more efficient price discovery (Drake et al. 2014). The 
coefficients on the proxies for absolute performance (Abs_Median_miss and Abs_ROA) 
suggest that absolute performance is positively associated with information asymmetry 
potentially due to its impact on investor’s prior beliefs. Firm size (Log_MarketValue) and 
book-to-market (log_BooktoMarket) are both positively related to information asymmetry. 
Finally, analyst following (Log_NumAnalysts), institutional investment 
(Pcnt_InstitHoldings), and attention during the pre-period (Log_TotalRequests_Pre) 
provide mixed results as to their relation with information asymmetry around quarterly 
earnings announcements.  
5.2 Trading around Earnings Announcements 
To examine whether investor geographic dispersion is associated with greater 
trading around a quarterly earnings announcement, I use the following OLS regression 
model: 
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𝐴𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑣 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖Σ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖    
(4) 
where AVolume is abnormal trading volume around a quarterly earnings announcement, 
calculated as the average trading volume of the firm during the event period minus the 
average trading volume of the firm during the non-event period scaled by the standard 
deviation of the trading volume during the non-event period. Controls include the controls 
listed in Chapter 4.2, the absolute value of ROA, and the absolute value of the earnings 
surprise. i and t are firm and year-quarter, respectively. Industry, year, and month fixed 
effects are also included in the model. Standard errors are clustered by firm and report date. 
The results of model (4) are shown in Table 6. The coefficient estimate on 
InvestorGeoDisp is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level suggesting that 
greater investor geographic dispersion is associated with higher trading volume. This 
finding is consistent with my prediction that greater investor geographic dispersion leads 
to greater trading during the price discovery process. The coefficient estimate of 0.5278 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in InvestorGeoDisp leads to an increase in 
AVolume(-1,1) of 0.0190. This is 2.08% of the standard deviation in AVolume(-1,1) (0.914) 
and 1.636 times the magnitude of the mean (-0.055).  
Consistent with the findings in prior studies, the controls for greater attention on 
the earnings announcements (Log_TotalRequests(-1,1), Friday, and NumEA) are 
negatively associated with abnormal trading volume around the earnings announcements 
(Drake et al. 2012). Total attention on the firm during the pre-period 
(Log_TotalRequests_Pre) is positively associated with total trading volume around 
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earnings announcements. I find a positive relation between the percentage of institutional 
holdings in the firm and trading volume (Knayazeva et al. 2013). The positive coefficient 
on firm size (Log_MarketValue) and the negative coefficient on book-to-market 
(Log_BookToMarket) suggest that larger firms and growth firms exhibit greater trading 
within the market around quarterly earnings announcements. 
5.3 Informativeness of Price 
I examine the relation between investor dispersion and the informativeness of price 
around a firm’s quarterly earnings announcement using the following OLS regression:  
 
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖Σ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖   
 
(5) 
where DriftRev is the drift or reversal in price following an earnings announcement 
calculated over the long window periods of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 trading days after the 
announcement. Details about the calculation of DriftRev can be found in Chapter 4.1.5. 
Controls include the controls listed in Chapter 4.2, the absolute value of ROA, and the 
absolute value of the earnings surprise. i and t are firm and year-quarter, respectively. 
Industry, year, and month fixed effects are also included. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and report date. 
 Table 7 presents the result of model (5) for each of the long window periods of 5, 
10, 15, 20, and 25 trading days following the earnings announcement. The findings suggest 
that the price reaction during the event period around quarterly earnings announcements is 
closer to the long window reaction for firms with a greater geographic dispersion of 
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investors. For each of the long window periods of 5, 10, 15, and 25 trading days I find that 
the estimated coefficient on InvestorGeoDisp is negative and statistically associated with 
DriftRev at either the 1% or 5% level for all five windows. The test of the difference 
between the coefficient estimates for InvestorGeoDisp for the five day window (-0.4188) 
and the fifteen day window (-0.5927) yields a t-stat of -0.69 and a p-value of 0.487 
therefore I cannot reject the null that the coefficient estimates are equal at conventional 
levels of significance. A test of the equivalence of the coefficient estimates on 
InvestorGeoDisp between the five day window and the twenty five window (-0.2815) 
yields a t-stat of 0.68 and a p-value of 0.495. Again, I cannot reject the null that the 
coefficient estimates are equal at conventional levels.   
 I measure the economic significance of a one standard deviation change 
InvestorGeoDisp using the average of the coefficient estimates across each of the five long 
windows (DriftRev5 through DriftRev25). The average coefficient estimate on 
InvestorGeoDisp across the five windows is -0.396 which suggests that a one standard 
deviation change in InvestorGeoDisp leads to a change in price drift or reversal of -1.415%.  
Consistent with prior research, I find that the amount of attention on the earnings 
announcements (Log_TotalRequests(-1,1), Friday, and NumEA) is negatively related to 
drift or reversals in price (Drake et al. 2012c). The coefficient on the magnitude of the 
surprise is negatively related to the amount of drift. This is consistent with big surprises 
leading to greater attention and therefore more efficient incorporation of information. The 
coefficient estimate on the absolute value of ROA (Abs_ROA) is positive suggesting that 
larger magnitudes of performance are more difficult to interpret and incorporate into price. 
A greater abnormal change in price during the prior quarter (Abs_Abn_Return_Pre) is 
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associated with greater drift or reversals in price, consistent with price momentum (Lee 
and Swaminathan 2000). Analyst following (Log_NumAnalysts) and the percentage of 
institutional holdings in the firm (Pcnt_InstitHoldings) is associated with lower drift or 
reversals in price. Larger firms (Log_MarketValue) and growth (Log_BooktoMarket) firms 
have greater drift or reversal in price suggesting that price formation may be more difficult 
for these firms. 
5.4 Geographic Distribution of Information 
Table 8 presents the results for the OLS regression of information asymmetry, 
trading, and the informativeness of price on investor geographic dispersion, partitioned by 
firms with high and low geographic distribution of information. A firm is categorizes as a 
high (low) geographic distribution of information firm if the number of unique states and 
countries mentioned in the 10-K is above (below) the median this tally.1415 Overall, the 
findings are consistent with my prediction that the effect on investor geographic dispersion 
on the price discovery process around quarterly earnings announcements is greater for 
firms with high geographic distribution of information.  
Table 8 Panel A shows the results for the regression of information asymmetry on 
investor geographic dispersion and controls, partitioned by firms with high and low 
geographic distribution of information. As predicted, for high distribution firms I find that 
ABid-Ask(-1,1), ADepth(-1,1), and AIlliquidity(-1,1) are statistically associated with 
                                                          
 
14 A firm’s 10-K provides an overview of the company and thus provides information to estimate the geographic 
distribution of value relevant information (Addoum et al. 2013) 
 
15 An alternative measure of the geographic distribution of information about a firm could be industry classification. 
However, research suggests that industry classifications are at best noisy proxies of a firms business (Bhojraj et al. 2003) 
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investor geographic dispersion at the 1% level. The sign of the estimated coefficient on 
InvestorGeoDisp for all three regressions is consistent with a positive association between 
investor geographic dispersion and information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The differences between the coefficient estimates on InvestorGeoDisp 
between firms with high and low distributions of information for the regressions of ABid-
Ask(-1,1), ADepth(-1,1), and AIlliquidity(-1,1) on InvestorsGeoDisp are 0.8105, -0.3852, 
and 0.3123 and are significant at the 1%, 10%, and 5% levels, respectively. The magnitudes 
of the estimated coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
InvestorGeoDisp leads to a 0.02917, -0.1386, and 0.0112 change in ABid-Ask(-1,1), 
ADepth(-1,1), and AIlliquidity(-1,1) which is equivalent to 2.16%, 1.37%, and 1.57% of 
the standard deviations and 0.06, 69.3, and 1.87 times the magnitude of each respective 
measure. 
 Next, the results in Table 8 Panel B suggest that the effect of investor geographic 
dispersion on trading around quarterly earnings announcements is greater for firms with 
high geographic distribution of information. The estimated coefficients on 
InvestorGeoDisp are 0.8033 and 0.3000 and are statically significant at the 1% and 10% 
level for firms with high and low distributions of information, respectively. The difference 
between the estimated coefficients of 0.5033 is statically significant at the 1% level. The 
magnitude of this coefficient suggests that a one standard deviation increase in 
InvestorGeoDisp leads to a 0.0181 increase in AVolume(-1,1) which is 1.98% of its 
standard deviation and 9.15 times the magnitude of its mean.   
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 Lastly, in Table 8 Panel C, I find evidence of a negative and statistically significant 
association between InvestorGeoDisp and DriftRev for the firms with a high distribution 
of information and less evidence of an association for firms with a low distribution of 
information. For high distribution firms, the estimated coefficient on InvestorGeoDisp is 
negative and statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% levels of significance across all 
five windows of DriftRev. On the other hand, for low distribution firms, I only find a 
negative and statistically significant association at the 5% level between InvestorsGeoDisp 
and DriftRev for the 15 day window. The differences in the estimated coefficients on 
InvestorGeoDisp between high and low distribution of information firms is significant at 
the 1% and 10% levels for the 5 day and the 10 day windows, respectively. The magnitudes 
of these differences suggest that a one standard deviation increase in InvestorGeoDisp 
leads to -2.96% and -1.72% changes in DriftRev5 and DriftRev10, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Robustness 
6.1 Placebo Earnings Announcement Dates 
One potential concern is that my empirical findings could be driven by overall 
differences in the market and not necessarily differences in the price discovery of quarterly 
earnings announcements for firms due to investor dispersion. I explore this possibility by 
examining the relation between investor dispersion and price discovery around a placebo 
quarterly earnings announcement date. If my empirical findings are driven by overall 
differences in the market then I expect to find similar relations between investor dispersion 
and my proxies for price discovery around placebo quarterly earnings announcement dates.  
I specify a placebo quarterly earnings announcement date as approximately 1 month 
(25 trading days) after the actual quarterly earnings announcement date. I then estimate my 
measures of information asymmetry, trading, and the informativeness of price around these 
placebo earnings announcement dates and estimate models (3), (4), and (5) using these new 
measures. In untabulted results, I find that investor geographic dispersion is not associated 
with abnormal information asymmetry, trading, or the informativeness of price around 
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placebo earnings announcement dates.1617 This is consistent with my hypothesis that the 
relation between investor dispersion and price discovery is driven by differing 
interpretations of earnings announcements and not by overall differences in the market 
among firms due to the geographic dispersion of investors.  
6.2 Market Reaction around Earnings Announcements 
A potential concern for my tests of the efficient of price formation is that less 
information may be incorporated into price around quarter earnings announcements for 
firms with a greater geographic dispersion of investors. This would result in a lower price 
reaction around earnings announcements and, potentially, lower price drift or reversal. 
While possible, this would not explain why I find greater information asymmetry and 
trading around quarterly earnings announcement for firms with a greater geographic 
dispersion of investors.  
To address this concern, I explore the relation between investor geographic 
dispersion and the absolute value of abnormal returns around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The results of the regression of the absolute value of abnormal returns 
around quarterly earnings announcements (Abs_Abn_Return(-1,1)) on investor geographic 
dispersion (InvestorGeoDisp) and controls are presented in Table 9. I find that the 
estimated coefficient on InvestorGeoDisp is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The magnitude of the coefficient (0.0243) suggests that a one standard deviation 
                                                          
 
16 I also use 5, 10, 15, and 20 weekdays following the quarter earnings announcement as placebo earnings 
announcement dates and find similar results. 
 
17 I still find a positive and statistically relation between investor’s geographic dispersion and abnormal bid-ask spread 
around the placebo quarterly earnings announcement date. However, the magnitude of the relation is economically 
smaller by approximately 50%.  
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increase in InvestorGeoDisp leads to an increase in the absolute value of the abnormal 
returns around the earnings announcement of 9 basis points. This suggest that when a firms 
investors are geographically dispersed more information is incorporated into price around 
quarterly earnings announcement. 
Next, to further address this concern, I examine the relation between the geographic 
dispersion of investors and the magnitude of new information within the disclosure 
released during quarterly earnings announcements. I proxy for the magnitude of new 
information using the absolute value of actual earnings minus the median analyst consensus 
forecast. I regress my proxy for new information on my measure of investor geographic 
dispersion and controls. In untabulated results, I find that the geographic dispersion of 
investors is not related to the magnitude of the earnings surprise.  
6.3 Outsourcing Companies using EDGAR 
A possible concern with my measure of the geographic dispersion of investors is 
that individuals who access the EDGAR system from certain countries abroad are not 
investors but rather are individuals from outsourcing firms. Specifically, these concerns are 
about outsourcing companies primarily located in India. These companies can be hired by 
large investors or data aggregators to hand code disclosures into machine readable format. 
Descriptive evidence provided in Figure 1 and Table 2 is consistent with this concern.18  
I address this concern by removing requests which originating from India in my 
sample. I then recalculate my measure of investor geographic dispersion and rerun my main 
                                                          
18 A representatives from a large US based financial data aggregator confirmed that some of their datasets are collected 
through operations located in India. 
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tests using this new measure. In untabulated results, I find that this does not affect my 
findings.  
6.4 American Depository Receipt (ADR) Listings 
American Depository Receipt (ADR) listings represent shares in a foreign stock 
that are traded within the US market. Since the operations of such firms are primarily non-
US, this may impact investor dispersion.  Moreover, the trading volume for the shares of 
these firms may be more greatly determined by their shares in their primary market, thereby 
potentially skewing my tests of trading which rely on trading volume within the US market.  
To address this concern I identify 552 potential ADR listed firms within Compustat 
which exist during my sample period and remove them from my sample. Untabulated 
findings suggest that this does not materially change my findings.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
This study provides novel empirical evidence that the geographic dispersion of 
investors affects the diversity of information among investors and, by extension, the price 
discovery process around a firm’s earnings announcements. Specifically, I find that 
investor geographic dispersion is positively associated with information asymmetry in the 
market and greater trading volume around quarterly earnings announcements. Moreover, I 
find that these firms are associated with lower price drift or reversal following these 
announcements. These results are more pronounced for firms with a greater geographic 
distribution of information.   
The findings in this study make two main contributions to the extant literature. First, 
the findings contribute to the burgeoning literature which explores the impact of location 
on the information an investor possesses about a firm. Prior research in this area has 
primarily examined the effects of an investor’s location on trading behavior and profits. I 
contribute to this area of research by providing empirical evidence that investor location 
dispersion has implications for the price discovery process of a firm. Second, my study 
contributes to the literature by providing a method for determining investor location from 
the EDGAR filing system. This insight into investor’s locations enhances the descriptive 
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evidence available about investors using the EDGAR system and thus contributes to a fuller 
understanding of the results in prior research based on investor requests for firm filings to 
the EDGAR system. 
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 Figure 1 – Locations of Requests for Firms Filings World-Wide 2005 – 2012  
Figure 1 presents a summary of the locations of the requests to the EDGAR filing system for the entire sample. The size of each dot corresponds to the relative number of request 
from that location. A latitude and longitude position is plotted only if there have been more than 10,000 requests from that location over the entire sample. This limitation was 
imposed due to constraints on the size of the dataset which could be use in the mapping software.  
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 Figure 2 – Locations of Requests for Firms Filings within the United States 2005 – 2012  
Figure 2 presents a summary of the locations of the requests to the EDGAR filing system within the lower 48 contiguous U.S. states for the entire sample.  The size of each dot 
corresponds to the relative number of request from that location. A latitude and longitude position is plotted only if there have been more than 10,000 requests from that location 
over the entire sample. This limitation was imposed due to constraints on the size of the dataset which could be use in the mapping software.  
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 Figure 3 – Locations of Requests for Firms Filings within New York City 2005 - 2012  
This figure presents the locations of the request for firms’ filings within the New York City area. Each of the five distinct boroughs 
of New York City is marked on the map, Staten Island (lower left), The Bronx (upper right), Manhattan (center), Brooklyn (lower 
center), and Queens (center left). Due to the size of the data set and the constraints of the mapping software, a latitude and longitude 
position is plotted only if there have been more than 10,000 requests from that location of the entire sample period. The size of each 
dot represents the relative number of request which originated from that specific latitude and longitude location. 
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 Figure 4 – High versus Low Investor Geographic Dispersion 2011  
Figure 4 presents the locations of the requests for firms filings to the EDGAR filings system for firms with high and low investor 
geographic dispersion. Panel A presents the locations of the request for firms’ filings for firms in the top 10% of investor geographic 
dispersion. Panel B presents the locations of the request for firms’ filings for firms in the bottom 10%.  
 
(a) High Investor Geographic Dispersion 
 
 
(b) Low Investor Geographic Dispersion 
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 Table 1 – Sample of Requests to EDGAR  
Table 1 provides a summary of the number of requests to the EDGAR web server used in this study. The main 
sample of requests spans from 1/1/2005 to 3/31/2012. Panel A provides a summary of the total number of requests 
and the number of requests removed during each stage of the sample selection processes. Automated requests are 
those which come from automated programs; details about how automated requests were identified can be found 
in Chapter 3. Panel B presents the number of requests and the number of request with location information and a 
GVKEY by year.  
 Panel A - Total Requests     
  Requests Less % Loss  
 Total Requests 3,822,564,344    
 Less: Automated Requests   3,313,944,869 87%  
 Requests 508,619,475    
 Less: No Location Information  161,366,759 4%  
 Less: No GVKEY to CIK Match   89,251,276 2%  
 Requests with Location and GVKEY 258,001,440    
          
 Panel B - Summary of Requests and Requests with Location and GVKEY by Year  
 
Year Months Requests 
Requests with 
Location and 
GVKEY 
 
 2005 12 33,609,976 21,484,570  
 2006 12 31,910,119 17,114,825  
 2007 12 51,535,524 28,547,522  
 2008 12 62,837,925 33,622,515  
 2009 12 93,912,186 45,399,859  
 2010 12 106,454,684 50,683,731  
 2011 12 111,475,245 52,518,456  
 2012 3 16,883,816 8,629,962  
 Total 87 508,619,475 258,001,440  
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 Table 2 – Top 10 Countries, States, and Cities by Number of Requests to EDGAR 2005 – 2012  
Table 2 presents the top 10 locations by number of request to the EDGAR filings system by country, U.S. state, and city. Requests is the total number of requests after removing 
automated downloads and requiring location and GVKEY information. Percentage is the total number of requests in the given location divided by the total number of requests 
word-wide in my sample (n = 258,001,440).  
 (a) Top 10 Countries  (b) Top 10 U.S. States  (c) Top 10 Cities  
 Country Requests Percentage  State Requests Percentage  City Requests Percentage  
 United States 199,136,738 77.18%  New York 34,053,350 13.20%  New York City 25,137,610 9.74%  
 India 12,931,296 5.01%  California 28,466,284 11.03%  Chicago 5,214,951 2.02%  
 Canada 7,507,438 2.91%  Texas 13,688,249 5.31%  Los Angeles 4,223,921 1.64%  
 U.K. 5,220,715 2.02%  Illinois 10,414,978 4.04%  Houston 3,902,142 1.51%  
 China 4,940,127 1.91%  New Jersey 9,208,464 3.57%  San Francisco 3,574,423 1.39%  
 Hong Kong 2,869,908 1.11%  Massachusetts 8,346,189 3.23%  Washington 3,261,591 1.26%  
 Japan 2,449,060 0.95%  Pennsylvania 7,593,219 2.94%  London 2,977,769 1.15%  
 Germany 1,728,459 0.67%  Florida 7,026,174 2.72%  Dallas 2,751,587 1.07%  
 Taiwan 1,280,957 0.50%  Ohio 5,858,123 2.27%  Boston 2,495,090 0.97%  
 Singapore 1,216,275 0.47%  Virginia 5,687,727 2.20%  Toronto 2,475,453 0.96%  
 Israel 1,163,686 0.45%  Georgia 4,328,990 1.68%  Philadelphia 2,324,689 0.90%  
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 Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the sample used in this study. The event period is defined as T-1 to T+1 event days around 
the earnings announcements and the non-event period is the window T-54 to T-5. InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of 
investors; details can be found in Chapter 3.2. ABid-Ask(-1,1) is abnormal bid-ask spread during the event period calculated as the 
average difference between the offer and the bid prices of the firm’s stock scaled by the average of the offer and bid prices around 
the earnings announcement minus the average difference during the non-event period. The difference is scaled by the standard 
deviation over the non-event period. ADepth(-1,1) is the abnormal depth during the event period calculated as the bid price 
multiplied by the bid size plus the offer size multiplied by the offer price during the event period minus the non-event period scaled 
by the standard deviation over the non-event period. AIlliquidity(-1,1) is the Amihud illiquidity of the firm’s stock calculated around 
the firm’s earnings announcement; details can be found in Chapter 4. AVolume(-1,1) is the abnormal trading volume during the 
event period calculated as the difference between the average trading volume during the event period and the non-event period 
scaled by the standard deviation of the trading volume over the non-event period. DriftRevX is the log percentage of price drift or 
reversal following quarterly earnings announcements over the long window X trading days following the quarterly earnings 
announcement. It is calculated as the abnormal returns from T-1 to T+X minus the abnormal returns during the event period. The 
difference is then divided by the abnormal return over the long window then logged. Log_TotalRequests_Pre is the total number of 
requests for the firm’s filings during the quarter prior to the quarterly earnings announcement. Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) is the total 
number of requests for the firms’ filings during the event period. Friday is a flag which equals 1 if the earnings announcement takes 
place on a Friday. NumEA is number of earnings announcement on the given earnings announcement date. Abs_Median_Miss is 
the absolute value of the difference between analyst’s consensus forecasted earnings and actual earnings. Abs_ROA is the absolute 
value of the firm’s return-on-assets. Abs_Abn_Return_Pre is the absolute value of the firm’s abnormal return during the quarter 
prior to the earnings announcement. Pcnt_InstitHoldings is the percentage of institutional holdings in the firm calculated as the 
total number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Log_NumAnalysts is the 
log of the number of unique analyst forecasts for the firm during the quarter prior to the earnings announcement. Log_MarketValue 
is the log of the price of the firm’s stock at the end of the quarter multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding. 
Log_BooktoMarket is the log of total assets divided by the sum of the market value of equity plus total liabilities. 
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 Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics (continued)  
 Variable N Mean P25 Med P75 Std. Dev.  
 Investor Dispersion        
 InvestorGeoDisp 74,200 -0.094 -0.110 -0.085 -0.069 0.036  
 Information Asymmetry        
 ABid-Ask(-1,1) 73,990 0.499 -0.394 0.197 1.071 1.349  
 ADepth(-1,1) 73,990 -0.002 -0.646 -0.168 0.477 1.011  
 AIlliquidity(-1,1) 74,151 -0.006 -0.493 -0.158 0.325 0.713  
 Trading        
 AVolume (-1,1) 74,184 -0.055 -0.597 -0.243 0.148 0.914  
 Informativeness of Price        
 DriftRev5 74,197 -0.733 -1.524 -0.701 0.051 1.415  
 DriftRev10 74,197 -0.475 -1.158 -0.433 0.203 1.303  
 DriftRev15 74,197 -0.375 -1.003 -0.331 0.249 1.256  
 DriftRev20 74,197 -0.305 -0.884 -0.262 0.266 1.206  
 DriftRev25 74,197 -0.277 -0.819 -0.230 0.263 1.175  
 Investor Attention         
 Log_TotalRequests_Pre 74,200 6.969 6.504 7.009 7.496 0.717  
 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) 74,200 4.123 3.555 4.205 4.779 0.934  
 Friday 74,200 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250  
 NumEA 74,200 289.750 163.000 272.000 402.000 166.898  
 Performance        
 Abs_Median_Miss 74,200 0.110 0.015 0.040 0.100 0.229  
 Abs_ROA 74,200 0.027 0.005 0.014 0.029 0.044  
 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre 74,200 0.127 0.040 0.089 0.170 0.131  
 Other Characteristics        
 Pcnt_InstitHoldings 74,200 0.554 0.267 0.622 0.854 0.339  
 Log_NumAnalysts 74,200 1.411 0.693 1.386 2.079 0.897  
 Log_MarketValue 74,200 6.543 5.440 6.492 7.599 1.556  
 Log_BooktoMarket 74,200 -0.465 -0.760 -0.344 -0.065 0.520  
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 Table 4 - Pearson and Spearman Correlations  
Table 4 provides Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal for the approximately 74,200 observations in my main sample. Correlations at the 1% level are bolded. The event period is 
defined as T-1 to T+1 event days around the earnings announcements and the non-event period is the window T-54 to T-5. InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of investors; details can be found 
in Chapter3.2. ABid-Ask(-1,1) is the abnormal bid-ask spread during the event period calculated as the average difference between the offer and the bid prices of the firm’s stock scaled by the average of 
the offer and bid prices around the earnings announcement minus the average difference during the non-event period. The difference is scaled by the standard deviation over the non-event period. ADepth(-
1,1) is the abnormal depth during the event period calculated as the bid price multiplied by the bid size plus the offer size multiplied by the offer price during the event period minus the non-event period 
scaled by the standard deviation over the non-event period. AIlliquidity(-1,1) is the Amihud illiquidity of the firm’s stock calculated around the firm’s earnings announcement; details can be found in 
Chapter 4. AVolume(-1,1) is the abnormal trading volume during the event period calculated as the difference between the average trading volume during the event period and the non-event period scaled 
by the standard deviation of the trading volume over the non-event period. Log_TotalRequests_Pre is the total number of requests for the firm’s filings during the quarter prior to the quarterly earnings 
announcement. DriftRev5 is the log percentage of price drift or reversal following quarterly earnings announcements over the long window X trading days following the quarterly earnings announcement. 
It is calculated as the abnormal returns from T-1 to T+X minus the abnormal returns during the event period. The difference is then divided by the abnormal return over the long window then logged.  
DriftRev10,15,20,and 25 were not included for brevity; untabulated results suggest that their correlations are similar to DriftRev5. Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) is the total number of requests for the firms’ 
filings during the event period. Friday is a flag which equals 1 if the earnings announcement takes place on a Friday. NumEA is number of earnings announcement on the given earnings announcement 
date. Abs_Median_Miss is the absolute value of the difference between the median analyst’s consensus forecasted earnings and actual earnings. Abs_ROA is the absolute value of the firm’s return-on-
assets. Abs_Abn_Return_Pre is the absolute value of the firm’s abnormal return during the quarter prior to the earnings announcement. Pcnt_InstitHoldings is the percentage of institutional holdings in the 
firm calculated as the total number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Log_NumAnalysts is the log of the number of unique analyst forecasts for the 
firm during the quarter prior to the earnings announcement. Log_MarketValue is the log of the price of the firm’s stock at the end of the quarter multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding. 
Log_BooktoMarket is the log of total assets divided by the sum of the market value of equity plus total liabilities. 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
 1 InvestorGeoDisp  0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.16 0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.02  
 2 ABid-Ask(-1,1) 0.05  -0.19 0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.10 0.12 -0.01  
 3 ADepth(-1,1) 0.01 -0.17  -0.25 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.00  
 4 AIlliquidity(-1,1) -0.01 0.18 -0.23  0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02  
 5 AVolume(-1,1) -0.01 0.15 -0.10 0.08  0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.07 -0.04  
 6 DriftRev5 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.01  -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.05  
 7 Log_TotalRequests_Pre 0.19 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03  0.72 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.21 0.42 0.42 -0.04  
 8 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) 0.11 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.71  -0.09 -0.07 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.21 0.35 0.36 -0.06  
 9 Friday -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.10  -0.21 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.06  
 10 NumEA -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.19  0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02  
 11 Abs_Median_Miss -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01  0.03 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.20  
 12 Abs_ROA 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.13  0.10 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.54  
 13 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre 0.02 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.19  -0.09 -0.08 -0.25 0.01  
 14 Pcnt_InstitHoldings 0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.22 0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12  0.36 0.34 -0.10  
 15 Log_NumAnalysts 0.04 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.41 0.35 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.35  0.59 -0.16  
 16 Log_MarketValue -0.03 0.12 -0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.40 0.35 -0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.17 -0.27 0.31 0.58  -0.27  
 17 Log_BooktoMarket 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.03 0.15 -0.38 0.00 -0.06 -0.14 -0.23    
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Table 5 – Results of Regressing Information Asymmetry around Earnings Announcements on 
Investor Geographic Dispersion  
Table 5 presents results from the OLS regression of information asymmetry in period around quarterly earnings announcements (T-1 to 
T+1) on investor geographic dispersion. InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of investors; details can be found in Section 3.2. 
Information asymmetry is measured using three proxies: abnormal bid ask spread (ABid-Ask(-1,1)), abnormal depth (ADepth(-1,1)), and 
abnormal illiquidity (Ailliquidity(-1,1)). Detailed descriptions for each of the variables can be found in Appendix A. P-values are reported 
in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their respective sample 
distributions. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Month, year, 
and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by report date. 
  
Abnormal 
Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Abnormal 
Depth 
 
Abnormal 
Illiquidity  
  ABid-Ask(-1,1)  ADepth(-1,1)  AIlliquidity(-1,1)  
  (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  
 InvestorGeoDisp 1.3553*** 1.4318***  -0.2892** -0.3270***  0.2094** 0.2374**  
   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.024) (0.009)  (0.043) (0.019)  
 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1)  0.0292***   0.0170**   -0.0195***  
   (0.002)   (0.035)   (0.001)  
 Friday  0.0541   0.0023   0.0513*  
   (0.245)   (0.948)   (0.059)  
 NumEA  0.0003**   -0.0002**   0.0002***  
   (0.033)   (0.046)   (0.004)  
 Abs_Median_Miss  0.0097   0.0106   0.0428***  
   (0.684)   (0.552)   (0.003)  
 Abs_ROA  0.0153   -0.2944***   0.4287***  
   (0.913)   (0.005)   (0.000)  
 Log_TotalRequests_Pre  -0.0356**   -0.0401***   0.0219**  
   (0.015)   (0.004)   (0.021)  
 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre  -0.4250***   0.1844***   -0.0888***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002)  
 FirmGeoDist  0.0099   0.0005   -0.0123**  
   (0.375)   (0.949)   (0.042)  
 Pcnt_InstitHoldings  0.2407***   -0.0168   -0.0258***  
   (0.000)   (0.283)   (0.009)  
 Log_NumAnalysts  0.0575***   -0.0120*   -0.0231***  
   (0.000)   (0.079)   (0.000)  
 Log_MarketValue  0.0709***   -0.0468***   0.0025  
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.470)  
 Log_BooktoMarket  0.0990***   -0.0634***   0.0453***  
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
           
 Constant & Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
 Observations 73,984 73,984  73,984 73,984  74,145 74,145  
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.050 0.070  0.045 0.053  0.032 0.037  
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Table 6 – Results of Regressing Trading around Earnings 
Announcements on Investor Geographic Dispersion  
Table 6 presents results from the OLS regression of trading in the period around quarterly earnings 
announcements (T-1 to T+1) on investor geographic dispersion. InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic 
dispersion of investors; details can be found in Chapter 3.2. AVolume(-1,1) is abnormal trading volume 
calculated as the difference between the average trading volume in the period around quarterly earnings 
announcement and a non-event period (T-54 to T-5) scaled by the standard deviation of the trading volume 
over the non-event period. Detailed descriptions for each of the variables can be found in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their sample distributions. ***, **, and * denote 
two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Month, year, and 
industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by report date. 
  
Abnormal Trading Volume  
 AVolume(-1,1) 
  (p-value)  
 InvestorGeoDisp 0.5589***       0.5278***  
   (0.001)       (0.002)  
 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1)   -0.0624***  -0.0619***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Friday   -0.0827  -0.0812  
    (0.199)  (0.206)  
 NumEA   0.0000  0.0000  
    (0.886)  (0.873)  
 Abs_Median_Miss   0.0041  0.0039  
    (0.833)  (0.841)  
 Abs_ROA   0.0126  0.0106  
    (0.913)  (0.926)  
 Log_TotalRequests_Pre   0.0689***  0.0679***  
    (0.004)  (0.004)  
 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre   -0.0184  -0.0162  
    (0.606)  (0.653)  
 FirmGeoDist   -0.0116**  -0.0123**  
    (0.049)  (0.039)  
 Pcnt_InstitHoldings   0.0383***  0.0377***  
    (0.001)  (0.001)  
 Log_NumAnalysts   -0.0002  0.0003  
    (0.983)  (0.974)  
 Log_MarketValue   0.0136***  0.0138***  
    (0.007)  (0.006)  
 Log_BooktoMarket   -0.0339***  -0.0329***  
    (0.005)  (0.007)  
        
 Constant & Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Observations 74,178  74,178  74,178  
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.164   0.167   0.167  
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Table 7 – Results of Regressing Informativeness of Price around Earnings Announcements on Investor 
Geographic Dispersion 
 
Table 7 presents the OLS regression of price drift or reversal following quarterly earnings announcements on investor geographic dispersion. 
InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of investors; details can be found in Chapter 3.2. DriftRevX is calculated as the absolute value of 
the difference between the long window abnormal return (T-1 to T+X) minus the abnormal returns in the period around quarterly earnings 
announcements (T-1 to T+1) divided by the abnormal long window returns. Detailed descriptions for each of the variables can be found in 
Appendix A. P-values are reported in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
of their sample distributions. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Month, year, and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by report date. 
  Price Drift or Reversal  
  DriftRev5  DriftRev10  DriftRev15  DriftRev20  DriftRev25  
  (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)  
 InvestorGeoDisp -0.4095**   -0.4703***   -0.5437***   -0.2780**   -0.2785**  
   (0.018)   (0.003)   (0.000)   (0.049)   (0.045)  
 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) -0.0804***  -0.0652***  -0.0581***  -0.0451***  -0.0524***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Friday 0.0353  0.0383*  0.0238  0.0141  0.0095  
  (0.133)  (0.067)  (0.246)  (0.457)  (0.618)  
 NumEA 0.0003***  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001*  0.0000  
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.061)  (0.815)  
 Abs_Median_Miss -0.1246***  -0.0731***  -0.0826***  -0.0777***  -0.0899***  
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Abs_ROA 0.3492**  0.3566***  0.2794**  0.2487*  0.2810**  
  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.025)  (0.052)  (0.021)  
 Log_TotalRequests_Pre 0.0632***  0.0422***  0.0395***  0.0175  0.0396***  
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.124)  (0.000)  
 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre 0.1696***  0.0995**  0.1130***  0.1262***  0.0689*  
  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.060)  
 FirmGeoDist -0.0064  -0.0168  0.0053  -0.0099  0.0074  
  (0.602)  (0.120)  (0.608)  (0.326)  (0.458)  
 Pcnt_InstitHoldings -0.1072***  -0.0742***  -0.0462***  -0.0488***  -0.0526***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.000)  
 Log_NumAnalysts -0.0468***  -0.0345***  -0.0319***  -0.0147**  -0.0136**  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.034)  (0.042)  
 Log_MarketValue -0.0138**  -0.0035  -0.0021  0.0014  -0.0034  
  (0.013)  (0.507)  (0.679)  (0.780)  (0.447)  
 Log_BooktoMarket 0.0449***  0.0558***  0.0335***  0.0466***  0.0340***  
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.004)  
            
 Constant and Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Observations 74,191  74,191  74,191  74,191  74,191  
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.016   0.011   0.008   0.005   0.005  
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Table 8 – Results of Regressing Information Asymmetry, Trading, and the Informativeness of 
Price on Investor Geographic Dispersion, Partitioned by Geographic Distribution of Information  
 
Table 8 presents the effect of investor geographic dispersion (InvestorGeoDisp) on information asymmetry, trading, and the 
informativeness of price, partitioned by the geographic distribution of information about the firm. Firms are partitioned into high and 
low distribution of information using the number of unique states and countries mentioned in their 10-K filing. Panels A, B, and C 
present the estimated coefficients on InvestorGeoDisp from the regressions of information Asymmetry (ABid-Ask(-1,1), ADepth(-1,1), 
and AIlliquidity(-1,1)), trading (AVolume(-1,1)), and the informativeness of price (DriftRevX) on investor geographic dispersion 
(InvestorGeoDisp) with controls for firms with high and low geographic distribution of information, respectively.  The regressions are 
run on my main sample which contains approximately 74,200 observations. Detailed descriptions for each of the variables can be found 
in Appendix A. P-values are reported in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% of their sample distributions. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Month, year, and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by report date. 
 Panel A - Effect of Investor Geographic Dispersion on Information Asymmetry  
  High Distribution  Low Distribution  Difference  
 Information Asymmetry Measure (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)  
 ABid-Ask(-1,1) 1.8866***  1.0759***  0.8105***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.005)  
 ADepth(-1,1) -0.5283***  -0.1431  -0.3852*  
  (0.004)   (0.351)   (0.082)  
 AIlliquidity(-1,1) 0.4086***  0.0963  0.3123**  
  (0.002)  (0.440)  (0.044)  
 Panel B - Effect of Investor Geographic Dispersion on Trading  
  High Distribution  Low Distribution  Difference  
 Trading Measure (p-value)  (p-value)  (p-value)  
 AVolume(-1,1) 0.8033***  0.3000*  0.5033***  
  (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.002)  
 Panel C - Effect of Investor Geographic Dispersion on the Informativeness of Price  
  High Distribution  Low Distribution  Difference  
 Informativeness of Price Measure (p-value)   (p-value)   (p-value)  
 DriftRev5 -0.8793***  -0.0433  -0.8360***  
  (0.000)  (0.846)  (0.007)  
 DriftRev10 -0.7423***  -0.2612  -0.4811*  
  (0.000)  (0.221)  (0.089)  
 DriftRev15 -0.6848***  -0.4317**  -0.2531  
  (0.001)  (0.027)  (0.356)  
 DriftRev20 -0.4381**  -0.1605  -0.2776  
  (0.025)  (0.366)  (0.251)  
 DriftRev25 -0.4451**  -0.1623  -0.2834  
   (0.020)   (0.349)   (0.228)  
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 Table 9 – Results of Regressing Absolute Value of Abnormal Returns around  
Earnings Announcements on Investor Geographic Dispersion  
Table 9 presents results from the regression of the absolute value of returns in the period around quarterly earnings announcements (T-
1 to T+1) on investor geographic dispersion. InvestorGeoDisp is the geographic dispersion of investors; details can be found in Chapter 
3.2. Abs_Abn_Return(-1,1) is the absolute value of the firm’s abnormal return in the period around quarterly earnings announcements. 
P-values are reported in parenthesis below their respective coefficients. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their 
respective sample distributions. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by firm and by report date. 
  
|Abnormal Returns around Earnings Announcement| 
 
  Abs_Abn_Return(-1,1)  
  (p-value)  
 InvestorGeoDisp 0.0231**       0.0243***  
   (0.015)       (0.004)  
 Log_TotalRequests(-1,1)   0.0093***  0.0093***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Friday   0.0009  0.0010  
    (0.522)  (0.492)  
 NumEA   -0.0000*  -0.0000*  
    (0.064)  (0.074)  
 Abs_Median_Miss   0.0205***  0.0205***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Abs_ROA   0.0029  0.0028  
    (0.763)  (0.770)  
 Log_TotalRequests_Pre   -0.0003  -0.0004  
    (0.585)  (0.539)  
 Abs_Abn_Return_Pre   0.0483***  0.0484***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 FirmGeoDist   0.0022***  0.0021***  
    (0.000)  (0.001)  
 Pcnt_InstitHoldings   0.0045***  0.0045***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Log_NumAnalysts   0.0044***  0.0044***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Log_MarketValue   -0.0099***  -0.0099***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Log_BooktoMarket   -0.0066***  -0.0065***  
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
        
 Constant & Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Observations 74,191  74,191  74,191  
 Adjusted R-Squared 0.080   0.137   0.138  
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 Appendix A - Variable Definitions  
Appendix A provides definitions for each of the main variables used in this study. The event period is defined as the three trading days around 
quarterly earnings announcements (T-1 to T+1). The non-event period is defined as trading days T-54 to T-5 prior to quarterly earnings 
announcements. 
 Variable Definition  
 Geographic Dispersion   
 
InvestorGeoDisp 
Investor geographic dispersion is calculated over the prior quarter as the sum of 
squares of the number of unique requests in each geographic segment divided by 
the square of the sum of the number of unique requests. I multiply the ratio by -1 
so that larger values can be interpreted intuitively as reflecting greater dispersion. 
Details can be found in Chapter 3.2.  
 Information Asymmetry  
 
ABid-Ask(-1,1) 
Abnormal bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the average daily bid-
ask spread during the event period minus the non-event period. Average daily bid-
ask spread is calculated as the average of the difference between the offer and bid 
prices divided by the average of the offer and bid prices for the quotes over the 
given period. The difference is normalized by the standard deviation of the 
measure during the non-event period.    
 
ADepth(-1,1) 
Abnormal depth is the average bid size multiplied by the bid price plus the offer size 
multiplied by the offer price over the quotes of the firm’s stock during the event 
period minus the non-event period. The difference is normalized by the standard 
deviation of the measure during the non-event period.    
 
AIlliquidity(-1,1) 
Abnormal illiquidity is calculated as the absolute value of the daily return divided by 
the dollar value of trading volume for the day during the event period minus the 
non-event period. The difference is normalized by the standard deviation of the 
ratio during the non-event period.    
 Trading  
 
AVolume(-1,1) 
Abnormal trading volume is the difference between the average trading volume during 
the event period and the average trading volume during the non-event period. The 
difference is normalized by the standard deviation of volume over the non-event 
window.  
 Informativeness of Price   
 
DriftRevX 
Price drift or reversal is calculated as the absolute value of the percentage difference 
between the abnormal return during the event period and the abnormal return 
calculated over a long window period (T-1 to T+X, where X is 5, 10, 15, 20 and 
25 trading days).  
 Investor Attention   
 
Log_TotalRequests_Pre 
Total number of request to the EDGAR filing system for the firm’s filings during the 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement.  
 
Log_TotalRequests(-1,1) 
Total number of request to the EDGAR filing system for the firm’s filings during the 
event period around earnings announcements.  
 
Friday Flag set to 1 if the earnings announcement takes place on a Friday, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
NumEA 
Number of earnings announcements which take place on the same day as the given 
quarterly earnings announcement.   
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 Appendix A - Variable Definitions (continued)  
 Variable Definition  
 Performance   
 
Abs_Median_Miss 
Absolute value of the quarterly earnings surprise is calculated as the absolute value of the 
difference between actual earnings minus the median analyst consensus forecast.  
 
Abs_ROA 
Absolute value of return-on-assets is calculated as the absolute value of income before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets.  
 
Abs_Abn_Return 
Absolute value of value weighted abnormal returns for the given period is calculated at the 
absolute value of the compounded returns of the firm minus the value weighted compounded 
returns of the market over the same window.   
 Other Characteristics   
 Log_NumAnalysts Quarterly number of analyst forecasts.  
 
Log_MarketValue 
Log of the market value of the firm. The market value of the firm is calculated as the total 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the share price at the end of the quarter.   
 
Log_BooktoMarket 
Log of the firm’s book-to-market ratio. The book-to-market ratio is calculated as total assets 
divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities.  
 
Pcnt_InstitHoldings 
Percent of institutional holdings in the firm is calculated as the total number of shares held by 
institutional investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding from firms’ 13F 
filings.   
 
FirmGeoDist 
Flag set to 1 if the number of unique states plus the number of unique countries mentioned in 
the company’s 10-K filing is above the median for all firms. Countries were restricted to the 
top 50 countries in terms of economic development according to the United Nations 2012 
GDP estimates.  
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